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1
Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors (“Amici”) respectfully submit this brief in support
of the Petitioner.1
------------------------------------------------------------------

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici, listed in Appendix A, are professors of law
who research, write, and teach in the area of intellectual property. Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only, and imply no
institutional endorsement of the views expressed
herein. Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of
this case. Counsel for all parties have consented to the
filing of this brief.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, Congress
decided to separate applied art from industrial design,
admitting the former to copyright and excluding the
latter. It drew this distinction precisely because it intended to differentiate copyright from design and utility patent. Congress recognized as applied art only
those aesthetic features of a useful article that could
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae affirm that no counsel
for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
Amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Counsel for both parties have consented to
filing this brief.
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be “separated” from that useful article rather than being integrated into the article.
The correct test of separability therefore considers conceptual separability to be nothing more than a
coda to physical separability, and asks only whether
the claimed design could be removed from the article
and exist on its own as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work that is not a useful article. This test minimizes the need for courts to make judgments about the
aesthetic value of claimed features and the risk of anticompetitive strike suits. And it preserves the distinction Congress meant to draw between applied art and
industrial design.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
Congress made clear in the Copyright Act’s legislative history its intent to distinguish applied art from
industrial design, admitting the former to copyright
protection, and excluding the latter. Focusing on Congress’s distinction between applied art and industrial
design is key to understanding how copyright’s useful
articles doctrine works, and, in particular, how a court
may properly determine whether some aesthetic feature of a useful article is “separable” from the article’s
functional content and therefore protectable.
Courts should understand separability in terms of
whether the claimed feature of a useful article (1) can
be extracted from the article, even if doing so would
destroy the article, and (2) once extracted, would stand

3
alone as an original pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work (PGS work) that is not a useful article. Features
of useful articles that meet this test are properly classified as “applied art” – i.e., artistic content that has
been “applied” to a useful article, a category of subject
matter which, as this Court has previously held and
Congress affirmed, does not lose its copyrightability by
virtue of its application to a useful article. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Courts in recent years have abstracted away
from the distinction Congress intended and often have
attempted to determine separability by inquiring
whether the designer of a useful article was making
aesthetic choices relatively unconstrained by function.
See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372
F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Conceptual separability
exists . . . when the artistic aspects of an article can
be conceptualized as existing independently of their
utilitarian function. This independence is necessarily
informed by whether the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment
exercised independently of functional influences.”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d
1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). But that test has proven so
difficult to apply that even when courts agree on the
test, judges often disagree on the outcome of that test
applied to particular cases. Indeed, that happened in
this very case. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica,
L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).
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The disagreement is not surprising; judges are
not experts in design, and courts are neither wellpositioned to understand the fine points of the design
process for useful articles, nor to make judgments
about the degree to which aesthetic choices are constrained by an article’s function. Congress wisely did
not invite such an inquiry.
I.

Industrial Design v. Applied Art

In 1976, Congress replaced “works of art” as a category of copyrightable subject matter with “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(5). The
scope of this new category of copyrightable subject
matter was then qualified with respect to the use of
PGS works in “useful articles”:
[PGS works] shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
According to the Copyright Act’s legislative history, the statutory language dealing with useful articles was “drawn from Copyright Office Regulations
promulgated in the 1940’s,” as well as language added
to those regulations in the 1950’s to implement this
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Court’s decision in Mazer, 347 U.S. 201. H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659. According to those implementing regulations:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its
utility, the fact that it is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a [copyrightable] work of art. However, if the shape
of a utilitarian article incorporates features,
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will
be eligible for [copyright].
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959). The new statutory language of the 1976 Act was intended “to draw as clear a
line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial design.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55. As the House
Report explained:
The Committee has added language to the
definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works’ in an effort to make clearer the distinction between works of applied art protectable
under the bill and industrial designs not subject to copyright protection. . . .
Id. at 62-63. Thus, it is beyond peradventure Congress
did not want to transform copyright law into a general
industrial design protection system.2

2

Indeed, while separate protection for industrial design has
been repeatedly proposed, Congress always declined to add it to

6
The statute draws the line between applied art
and industrial design first by requiring a determination of whether the object at issue is a “useful article.”
The statutory definition of “useful articles” is broad,
encompassing all articles “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (emphasis added).3 For articles with any such intrinsic utilitarian function, the statute requires a second inquiry into the separability of any aesthetic
features of the article.
II.

The Separability Test

Elaborating on its understanding of separability,
the House Report said that “[a] two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being
identified as such when it is printed on or applied to
utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper,
containers, and the like. The same is true when a
statue or carving is used to embellish an industrial
product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a
the Copyright Act. See Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446-47 (3d Cir. 1994) (recounting the
history of congressional rejection); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d
1214, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring) (explaining that
design protection was initially included in the 1976 Act, but “was
jettisoned to facilitate passage of the main bill”).
3
Congress expanded the definition of “useful article” with
this language, broadening the former language, “sole utilitarian
function.” See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case
Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in MachineReadable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 730-32 (1984).
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product without losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55.
By contrast, “although the shape of an industrial
product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable,
the Committee’s intention [was] not to offer it copyright protection under the bill.” Id. Thus, “[u]nless the
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food
processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not
be copyrighted. . . .” Id.
As the House Report makes clear, aesthetic features are separable under this approach if they can
have a separate existence as a copyrightable work
apart from the useful article to which they have been
applied. The “over-all configuration,” id., of a useful article is simply not protectable under any circumstances; Congress protected sculptural works applied
to lamps, not lamps. It is irrelevant to Congress’s
distinction whether the features could have been designed differently or whether they were designed “independently” of functional considerations. Cf. Brandir,
834 F.2d at 1145. “[I]ndependence from ‘the utilitarian
aspects of the article’ does not depend upon the nature
of the design – that is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can
be identified separately from the useful article as such
are copyrightable.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (emphasis added).
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The examples of features Congress considered
separable under this standard – “a carving on the back
of a chair” and “a floral relief design on silver flatware”
– all follow a common theme. Id. Congress clearly
meant to protect features of useful articles that could
exist as a separate copyrightable work in some other
medium. The further examples included by the Copyright Office in its Compendium of U.S. Copyright Practices – “[a]n engraving on a vase,” “[a]rtwork printed
on a t-shirt,” “[a] colorful pattern decorating the surface of a shopping bag,” “[a] drawing on the surface of
wallpaper,” and “[a] floral relief decorating the handle
of a spoon” – follow this theme as well. COMPENDIUM OF
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES III § 924.2(B) (2014).
Conversely, Congress meant to exclude from copyright
protection features that are integrated into a work of
industrial design and make sense only as part of that
useful article.
This understanding allows courts to apprehend
and follow the statutory command that copyrightable
features of useful articles are limited to “features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Aesthetic
features of a useful article are “capable” of existing separately if they can be removed or extracted from the
useful article and the removed design would constitute
a PGS work, but not the design of a useful article. This
understanding also makes clear that courts have substantially overcomplicated so-called “conceptual” separability. Conceptual separability is not terra incognita

9
or some invitation for courts to develop their own theory of what is art versus function. It is, rather, a modest
extension of the concept of physical separability, the
other category that Congress specified in the Copyright Act’s legislative history.
Physical separability is found, for example, in an
epaulet that is sewn onto the shoulder of a jacket and
that may be readily removed without destroying the
jacket. “Conceptual” separability is closely related: it is
no more than separability that could not, in actual fact,
be carried out physically without destroying the underlying useful article – an example would be a graphic
design on an epaulet printed onto the shoulder of the
same jacket. Conceptual separability is a kind of coda
to physical separability.
Stated another way: if one could extract the
claimed features and use them on their own in another
context without replicating the useful article of which
they are part, and the result would be a copyrightable
PGS work standing alone, then there is separable matter. On the other hand, if extracting the claimed features would necessarily bring along the underlying
useful article, the design is inseparable from the useful
article. For example, an artistic design printed onto a
poster, and then veneered onto the back of a chair,
might be separable in the ordinary physical sense. The
same artistic design carved into the back of the chair
might not actually be removable without destroying
the chair. That design is nonetheless separable “conceptually,” for the same reason the design printed on
the poster is: the work would be the same work as a
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design on paper – a copyrightable graphic work. It
therefore is capable of an independent existence apart
from the underlying useful article. Likewise, the plaster-of-Paris sculpture encasing the electrical cords and
wiring in the lamp in Mazer v. Stein could not be physically separated from the cords and wiring without destroying the lamp (because of the materials from which
it was made), but the sculpture standing on its own
was not a lamp: it was a conceptually separable sculptural work. See Mazer, 347 U.S. 201.4
The test we propose faithfully implements Congress’s intent. The House Report states that “a twodimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still
capable of being identified as such when it is printed
on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like,” and that
“[t]he same is true when a statue or carving is used to
embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer
case, is incorporated into a product without losing its
ability to exist independently as a work of art.” H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62-63. This statement is consistent in its entirety with the test Amici propose.

4

One possible way to characterize the test Amici offer is that
courts should ignore the physical integrity of the underlying useful article in assessing separability. As indicated by the list of representative examples Congress offered, it is the impossibility of
removing some applied art without destroying the underlying object that led Congress to add “conceptual” separability, to make
clear that the useful article need not be preserved post-separation
for “separability” to exist.
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III. Separability Offers a Clear Way to Understand Most Useful Article Cases
Many older cases express a clear understanding of
the close connection between physical and conceptual
separability. Compare Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying copyright protection
to design of street lights), with Royalty Designs v.
Thrifticheck Service Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (finding copyrightable a coin bank shaped like a
dog, where shape was original), and Ted Arnold Ltd. v.
Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding copyrightable the design of a pencil sharpener in
the shape of an old-fashioned telephone that was not a
copy of any real telephone).5 As the courts have made
separability more complicated and contestable, plaintiffs have brought more extreme cases, reflecting the
litigation-generating effect of standards that are both
broad and unpredictable. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000) (noting
that anticompetitive suits are facilitated by unclear
tests and that “[c]ompetition is deterred . . . not merely
by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit,” justifying rules that are as bright-line as
possible).

5

As noted below, copyrightable elements are limited to the
creativity added by the creator, and also subject to the originality
and merger doctrines. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a copy of a public domain
bank was not independently copyrightable because changes were
made for functional, not creative, reasons).
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By focusing on separability, Amici’s proposed test
offers a simpler path to correct results. In Universal
Furniture Intern., Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,
618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010), the court correctly found
that the designs engraved into plaintiff ’s furniture
were separable, although its reasoning conflated the
question of aesthetics with that of protectability. See
id. at 423 (finding separability because the purpose
of carving the designs “was entirely aesthetic,” even
though the artist was also “influenced by function” in
designing the elements; nonetheless, the court thought
it faced a “metaphysical quandary” because “[t]he elements serve no purpose divorced from the furniture –
they become designs in space”). Under our proposed
analysis, the separability of engraved ornamental designs is clear.
The result in Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington
Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding
designs on laminated floor tiles physically and conceptually separable), is also consistent with our test, although the Eleventh Circuit made the case more
difficult by asking whether the design was separately
marketable in order to determine whether it was separable. There is probably no real market for pictures of
wood grain. But just as aesthetic merit is not an appropriate inquiry for courts, neither is whether a creative
work has a market waiting for it. The appropriate
question is whether the design could stand alone as a
work, not whether the work would have a market.
Similarly, Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Intern., Inc., 353
F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.R.I. 2005), the court correctly found
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that the design features of measuring spoons shaped
like heart-tipped arrows were not separable, because
replicating the design would necessarily produce
measuring spoons, which are useful articles.

See also Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine,
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (prom dress
design lacked separability), aff ’d sub nom. Jovani
Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed. App’x 42 (2d
Cir. 2012); Magnussen Furniture, Inc. v. Collezione
Europa USA, Inc., 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1997) (table
design features were not separable).
In Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d
1038 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit properly held
that the overall shape of a useful article is not copyrightable no matter how aesthetically pleasing that
shape may be. See id. at 1042 (holding that although
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Inhale’s water container, like a piece of modern sculpture, has a distinctive shape, “[t]he shape of the alleged
‘artistic features’ and of the useful article are one and
the same.”). See also Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804 (noting
that the legislative history indicates “unequivocally
that the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian
object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as
functional considerations, is not eligible for copyright”). Our proposed test implements this result. Any
replica of the overall shape would replicate the useful
article (even if it would not function because, for example, it was made out of different material). See also
Norris Industries, Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (no protection for wirespoked wheel cover).

Nor can inseparability be avoided by defining the
claimed design to be only a portion of a useful article.
For example, in Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, No. 06
Civ. 195(GEL), 2006 WL 2645196 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the
plaintiff claimed protection for the stitching and sole
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patterns on a shoe; the court properly found lack of
separability. Even in the abstract and without other
material present, the configuration of the stitching and
patterns on the sole still defined a shoe. If abstracted
away from the shape of a shoe, moreover, the only thing
remaining would be unoriginal circles and stitches. By
attending to the fact that three-dimensional designs
regularly depend on three-dimensional relationships
between elements, copyright’s originality requirement
can thus police against attempts to game the separability standard by claiming only portions of an article.
IV. Separability Channels Industrial Design
to Design Patent
Excluding inseparable features does not leave design without protection. Instead, the union of form and
function can readily be protected through the law of
design patent, as Congress intended. See Mark P.
McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress & Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 48-51
(2013) (focusing on the integration of form and function to define design patent subject matter).
This distinction between the protection offered by
design patent and the protection offered by copyright
corresponds to the simple conceptual separability test
outlined above. Moreover, it allows the Court to more
easily distinguish between works of applied art and
works of industrial design without resorting, as the
lower courts have, to some detailed theory of how
to separate art from function. If the claimed subject
matter is integrated into the design of the useful
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article or the part of the useful article which the subject matter comprises, then the claimed subject matter
is a work of industrial design, and protectable, if at all,
by design patent. This is true even though industrial
designs, like copyrightable works, have aesthetic qualities and might be perceived as “art” by patrons
thereof.6 The idea of separability, in other words, is the
removal of something from the useful article – which
necessarily implies that the separable features must
be less than the whole. The mere fact that the useful
article can be appreciated aesthetically says nothing
about whether the design is separable.
Neither are features separable simply because
they are aesthetic; if that were the test, then the only
useful articles that would be unprotected by copyright
would be those without any attractive features. But
(nearly) all industrial design is a mix of aesthetic
and functional. The Copyright Act reaches industrial
design only insofar as the pictorial, graphic or sculptural content of a particular useful article may exist
without the underlying article. To the extent this test
is met, then that PGS feature is copyrightable as a
work of applied art.
6

The United States recently joined the Hague Agreement.
See Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-211,
126 Stat. 1527 (2012). In implementing it, the U.S. decided to
channel foreign industrial design applications to the design patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 385 (“An international design application designating the United States shall have the effect, for all
purposes, from its filing date determined in accordance with section 384, of an application for patent filed in the Patent and Trademark Office pursuant to chapter 16.”). This decision bolsters the
argument that copyright is the wrong home for industrial design.
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The application of this analysis to the design of
cheerleader uniforms or other clothing designs is simple and clear: the aesthetic elements of a cheerleader
uniform exist only as part of a cheerleader uniform.
There is nothing to extract; the claimant claims the design of a useful article. By contrast, a fabric print
would be the same artwork if it were on a notebook
cover, wallpaper, or other surface.
The claimant here could, using an analogy to fabric prints, claim only the chevrons and not the coordination and arrangement thereof, which constitute the
cut of the garment. But that is not what the claimant asserts, likely because the chevrons themselves are standard uniform elements that lack the minimal spark necessary for copyrightability. Cf. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Yankee Candle Co., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Ill. 2012)
(finding that candle holders in the generalized shape of
sailboats were probably not separable, but definitely not
creative enough for copyright protection).

See also Eliya, 2006 WL 2645196 (similar result for design on outside of shoe).
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This analysis highlights an important point: separability is part of a larger scheme, in which multiple
doctrines have roles to play. The originality, idea/
expression, and merger doctrines limit the copyrightability of all creative works. Section 113(b) of the Copyright Act is of particular import here. Section 113(b)
provides that a copyright in a work depicting a useful
article does not extend to the manufacture, distribution, or display of that useful article. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b);
see, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759-60 (N.D. Ind.
2010) (applying § 113(b)); William F. Patry, Patry on
Copyright § 11:13 (2016) (“[C]opyright in a drawing of
a boiler, cabinet, or automobile would not prohibit unauthorized manufacture from drawings of those objects.”) (footnote omitted).
Thus, drawings or photographs of the uniform designs at issue, like drawings or photographs of any
other real-world objects, are copyrightable to the extent that they evince creativity, but they could not be
asserted against the making of the underlying useful
articles. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53 (1884); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
at 105 (explaining that the purpose of § 113(b) was to
preserve the principle that “copyright in a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work, portraying a useful article
as such, does not extend to the manufacture of the useful article itself ”).
Section 113(b) and separability are two sides of
the same coin, working together to solve the problems
caused by excluding industrial design from copyright.
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Patry, supra § 11:12 (“Both section 113(b) and the separability test for protection are designed to address
this conundrum [when the plaintiff ’s work depicts a
useful article].”). With the combination of separability
and § 113(b), one cannot claim copyright in a useful article by putting it on a necklace and wearing it as jewelry, no matter how aesthetic the effect:

ArmageddonArt, Real .223 Bullet Necklace with 24
Inch Chain, Etsy, (last modified July 2, 2016).7
Likewise, an artist cannot draw a design or carve
a sculpture for a new bullet, no matter how beautiful,
and get a claim over the resulting useful article. Cf.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The copyright

7

https://www.etsy.com/listing/104890409/real-223-bullet-necklacewith-24-inch.

20
of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described, though
they may never have been known or used before.”); J.H.
Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign
Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the
Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1207-08
(1983) (explaining the derivation of § 113(b) from
Baker). The artist’s copyright is limited to the original
elements of the PGS work depicting the useful article,
preserving her copyright interest in the art market
without interfering with the market for useful articles.
Cf. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147 (finding design of a bike
rack inseparable from its status as a bike rack, while
sculpture that looked like a bike rack, or a bike, could
be copyrightable if original).
For this reason, hypotheticals involving useful articles rendered in different sizes or materials – such as
a toy-sized uniform or a chair made out of tissue paper
– are inappropriate for determining whether the aesthetic features of the design that the claimant actually
made are separable.8 If we allow imaginary manipulations of the physicality of the article, no useful article
would ever be excluded from copyright, because at
some scale or in some material the utility of any article, or of any feature of an article, can be removed. The
fact that sculptures could be, and in fact have been,

8

The question of whether toys are themselves useful articles
is a difficult one, but one this Court need not decide, since no toys
are involved here.
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designed to look like sailboats does not mean that sailboats are not useful articles.
In sum, Amici’s proposed test offers a relatively
simple way to distinguish applied art from industrial
design, and thereby to distinguish separable from inseparable PGS features of useful articles. That said, no
test will apply with perfect clarity to all cases. Because
of the inevitable fuzziness in practice, the related risk
of oppressive and anticompetitive threats of suit, and
the availability of design patent protection for useful
articles, Amici suggest that the Court apply its wellgrounded reasoning in Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215: in
cases of doubt, a court should find that the claimed
matter is industrial design and therefore not separable.
V.

Other Approaches to Separability and Their
Problems

The chaos in the courts of appeals and the extensive body of commentary on separability indicate that
current approaches have largely failed to produce rules
that courts can apply consistently; only our approach
offers a simple way out, grounded in the statute. In
contrast to this straightforward account of conceptual
separability – one that is consistent with the text of the
Copyright Act and Congress’s intent as expressed in
the Act’s legislative history – the various incompatible
tests currently employed by courts try to do something
that is conceptually intractable, which is to separate
protectable art from unprotectable functionality. Thus,
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many courts have articulated tests of conceptual separability that focus on whether particular features were
determined by aesthetic rather than functional considerations. See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 931 (collecting
cases).
That approach faces two insurmountable problems. First, it puts the law at odds with the subject
matter the law is regulating. Indeed, it is often observed that modern designers think of what they do in
terms of the integration of form and function – that is,
as the opposite of separability. Frank Lloyd Wright,
The Future of Architecture 296 (1953) (“Form and function are one.”); see also Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 660
(2014) (“The very best industrial design will seamlessly integrate form and function.”); Brett S. Sylvester,
The Future of Design Protection in the United States,
20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 261, 271 (1986) (“[T]he majority
of modern industrial designs are heavily influenced by
the Bauhaus approach to design which stresses the
unification of form and function.”).
Second, it runs squarely against Congress’s intent
by putting courts in the role of art theorists separating
the aesthetic from the functional. The relatively simpler separability analysis outlined above allows courts
to distinguish separable (and therefore copyrightable)
applied art from inseparable elements of industrial design, however aesthetically pleasing. Reichman, 1983
DUKE L.J. at 1261-62 (explaining that the definition
of PGS works was intended to channel cases away
from copyright and into separate industrial design
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legislation, which was then removed from the final
bill). Congress defined PGS works as it did because it
wanted to differentiate the domain of copyright from
that of design patent, the legal regime that protects the
ornamental, aesthetic features of industrial design.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54.
Courts’ attempts to differentiate aesthetics and
function has led them astray in a number of cases. The
features of the belt buckle in Kieselstein-Cord could not
be replicated without replicating a belt buckle. The
court was therefore wrong to find conceptual separability just because the belt buckle could be used (as a
whole) as jewelry. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (“We see in
appellant’s belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements, as apparently have the buckles’ wearers who have used them as ornamentation for parts of
the body other than the waist.”).
Kieselstein-Cord got the distinction wrong because
the court asked whether the article could be used in
some other, nonutilitarian context rather than asking
whether any features of the article could have a separate existence. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. In
other words, Kieselstein-Cord mistakenly conflated
separability with the question of whether the buckle
would be useful in any context in which it was put
(which, of course, no useful article is). Putting a urinal
in a museum was art, at least when Duchamp did it;
that does not mean the urinal was copyrightable. Likewise, exhibiting a buckle in an art museum, or wearing
it around one’s neck, does not make the design of the
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buckle separable from the buckle itself.9 There may be
thirteen (or more) ways of looking at a belt buckle, but
the buckle itself remains a buckle.
In Carol Barnhart, the court considered whether
the aesthetic and artistic features were separable from
the forms’ use as utilitarian articles (torsos for displaying clothing). Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Newman, in
dissent, would have asked whether the article “stimulate[s] in the mind” of the “ordinary, reasonable observer” “a concept that is separate from the concept
evoked by its utilitarian function.” Carol Barnhart, 773
F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). This is the overcomplicated conceptual fallacy discussed above: the
question is not whether one can look at a urinal, or a
Porsche, and see art. The legislative history of the 1976
Act explains that the definition of “ ‘pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works’ carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55. The question is
whether features of the Porsche could have a separate
existence as a work. And clearly they cannot. Neither
could the torso forms in Carol Barnhart.10
9

Design patent, however, would remain available for any
similar novel design that was timely registered.
10
It is also important to remember that significant work
takes place at the stage of identifying what is a “useful article” as
well. Ordinarily, sculptures are not useful articles, though people
can hang clothes (or lampshades) on them. Again, the Court is not
asked here to articulate a test for determining in every case what
a “useful article” is. If the Court asks separability to do too much
of the definitional work for which originality, the scope of “useful
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Another Second Circuit panel in Brandir as well
as a Seventh Circuit panel in Pivot Point focused on
the designer’s intention in creating the work, holding
that copyrightability “should depend on the extent to
which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited
by functional considerations.” Brandir, 834 F.2d at
1145 (quoting Robert Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741-45 (1983));
see also Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 926-27 (adopting
Brandir/Denicola test). This approach is directly contrary to congressional guidance in the legislative history, which made clear that the fact that features
were developed for aesthetic reasons independent of
function did not make them separable. H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 55 (emphasizing Congress’s intention to
exclude industrial design that was “aesthetically satisfying and valuable” from copyright).
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Galiano asked whether
claimed copyrightable aspects of the work are themselves “marketable to some significant segment of the
community.” Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416
F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005). Again, the court’s test
wrongly collapses separability into artistic quality.
Highly marketable, beautiful designs are protectable
by design patent; artistic works for which there is no
market are protectable by copyright.
-----------------------------------------------------------------article,” and other doctrines are better suited, it risks continuing
the incoherence and struggle that produced the present mishmash of cases.
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CONCLUSION
Congress decided to separate industrial design
from applied art, leaving industrial design protectable,
if at all, only through utility patent or design patent.
To protect this distinction and limit the coverage of
copyright to applied art, the Court should adopt the
simplest possible test for separability, one that minimizes the need for courts to make aesthetic judgments
and the risk of anticompetitive strike suits. A test that
considers conceptual separability to be a coda to physical separability, and therefore asks only whether the
claimed design could be removed from the article and
have an existence as a PGS work, or whether instead
the claimed design is the article (or part thereof ), is the
best approach.
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